Alliance Portfolio and Platform Adoption.
Published:
with Xavier Martin and Niels Noorderhaven, full draft.
Published:
with Xavier Martin and Niels Noorderhaven, full draft.
Published:
With Xavier Martin, conceptualization stage.
Published:
With Jiuyu Dong, conceptualization stage.
Published:
With Yuping, data collection stage.
Published:
with Xiaofei Qu and Jiahe Wang, conceptualization stage.
Published:
My second paper, which serves as my job market paper, uses fixed-effects Poisson models and extensive robustness checks to explore the impact of first-party complement provision (FPCP) on complementors’ new complement releases. FPCP refers to a platform owner offering its own complements alongside those of complementors, as seen with Sony releasing in-house games for PlayStation. The findings reveal that while FPCP may reduce the number of games a complementor releases in the focal genre, this effect is contingent on factors that reveal the potential benefits of FPCP to complementors. Specifically, when there is a significant preceding decline in genre strength, the negative impact of FPCP can shift to a positive one. Subsample analyses reveal that younger publishers are more sensitive to FPCP and to changes in genre strength. These results identify novel conditions under which negative effects of FPCP may turn positive. The paper is under review at Strategic Management Journal.
Published:
In my first study, using a hazard model and employing instrumental variable techniques for robustness checks, I find that platform owners are more likely to introduce first-party complements that reveal development knowledge, particularly in technically demanding genres and in those where little such knowledge has been provided by existing complements. Additionally, a platform owner tends to introduce first-party complements to enhance a genre’s uniqueness when originally exclusive complements have been multihomed to other platforms. The underlying logic is that FPCP can increase a genre’s appeal to complementors by demonstrating how to develop complements within that genre (supply side) and by attracting more customers through improving the genre’s uniqueness (demand side). This paper is aimed for submitting to either the Strategic Management Journal or Organization Science.
Published:
In my third study, I investigate whether the platform owner or complementors are more likely to engage in risky and novel product development, considering the changes in the category strength. Typically, firms would like to take on such risks when expected demand is high. I argue that in platform-mediated ecosystems, the platform owner considers a different benefit calculation: leveraging novel games to enhance the platform’s overall value to users, and consequently, its profit potential for complementors. Rather than avoiding risks due to lower expected demands such as in scenarios where a category strength declines, the platform owner is more likely to conduct novel product development to revitalize its platform’s ecosystem. With video game data, I use the machine learning technique to construct the novelty measurement based on games’ description.